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Abstract In this paper, 1 will describe examples of state-of-the-art practice in 
supply-chain management; e.g., vendor-managed inventory, quick re-
sponse, and other contemporary systems, such as Wal-Mart's RetailLink. 
The perspective will be that of what I call the JDJB Portfolio; i.e., 
what Information (I), Decision-Making {D), Implementation (I), and 
Buffer (B) systems are employed in managing real-world supply chains. 
Most operations-research models consider only two components of this 
portfolio: the decision-making and the buffer systems. More specifi-
cally, most operations-research models involve selecting a decision-rule 
to minimize expected buffer (e.g., inventory-holding and backorder) cost 
given a fixed level of information. Implementation as a decision vari-
able is typically ignored. However, in the real world, with changing 
information, communication, and implementation technologies, supply-
chain management can - and should - be viewed as changing the nature 
of the entire IDIB Portfolio. After interpreting current practice from 
the perspective of the IDIB Portfolio, I will forecast future practice us-
ing Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR) as 
an example. I will describe the elements of CPFR, identify companies 
that are using lt, and the challenges they face in realizlng lts poten-
tial. Finally, I will identify research opportunities in CPFR, and, more 





We've all seen one version of it or another: The consulting company's 
Power-Point slide representing the evolution of supply-chain manage-
ment (SCM). A staircase ascends left to right: on the bottom step is 
"Basic Supply-Chain Management", typically intra-company MRP or 
ERP systems; and on the top step, "Advanced Supply-Chain Manage-
ment", typically described as ~'wireless, broad-band, web-based, truly 
collaborative, etc.". The next slide asks: ~~where is your company?" 
Sridhar Taynr (Carnegie Mellon University) displayed one of these 
staircase slides at a recent meeting of supply-chain thought leaders at 
Harvard University. Marshall Fisher (University of Pennsylvania) asked: 
"Does anyone know of any companies that are at or near the top step T' 
No one raised a hand. That slide, MarshalPs question, and no one's 
answer provided the motivation for this paper. 
In what follows I will do three things: First, I will describe the state-
of-the-art in supply-chain management practice. A caveat: my assess-
ment will be general; no details of specific buyer-supplier practice will be 
described. Second, I will introduce a paradigm - called the "IDIB Port-
folio1' - for understanding the evolution of supply-chain management to 
date1 and for predicting its future. Third 1 using this framework, I will 
suggest topics for research. 
My focus will be on managing the link(s) between buyers and suppliers 
that are independently owned and managed. Although centrally-owned 
and managed links provide a valuable benchmark1 the real challenges 
in supply-chain management involve two or more independently-owned 
and managed companies. Two fundamental challenges are posed in im-
proving the management of such supply chains: (1) the development of 
techniques to improve overall supply-chain performance (e.g. 1 increasing 
total supply-chain profit); and (2) the development of contracting mech-
anisms that will motivate all the partners to implement these techniques. 
In other words: (1) how to "enlarge the pie"; and (2) how to "provide 
larger slices" to all the partners. I will focus on the first challenge - the 
development of techniques to improve overall performance. See Cachon, 
2004 for a review of the supply-chain literature on the management of 
incentive conflicts with contracts. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of 
contemporary supply-chain management systems. In Sections 3-4 I will 
introduce the !DIE-Portfolio paradigm, describe what "managing the 
IDIB Portfolio" means, and contrast the IDIB-Portfolio paradigm with 
the operations-research paradigm. Section 5 uses the IDIB-Portfolio to 
provide a perspective on contemporary supply-chain management prac-
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tice. Section 6 describes two "Axioms of the IDIB Portfolio'' and, in 
section 7, I use these axioms to forecast the future of supply-chain man-
agement. Section 8 provides an overview of Collaborative Planning, 
Foreca.Stfllg, and Replenishment (CPFR), which, I believe, is one "con-
tender'' for the future of supply-chain management. In Section 9, I iden-
tify several_ research topics in CPFR1 in Section 110, several research 
topics in supply-chain collaboration, and, in Section 11, several research 
topics related to the IDIB Portfolio paradigm. Section 12 cites closely-
related references. Section 13 provides a summary. 
2. An overview of contemporary supply-chain 
management systems 
Vendor-Managed Inventory (VMI), introduced by Kurt Solomon As-
sociates in 1992 (http: I lwww. kurt salmon. com) is perhaps the most 
widely-known system for managing supply chains. Under VMI, the 
buyer authorizes the supplier (i.e., vendor) to manage the inventory of 
a set of stock-keeping units (SKUs) at the buyer's site(s) under agreed-
upon parameters (e.g., minimum and maximum inventory targets). The 
buyer provides the supplier with sales and/or inventory-status informa-
tion; and the supplier makes and implements decisions about replenish-
ment quantities and timings. 
VMI reduces information distortion, which is one cause of the "bull-
whip" effect {Lee et al., 1997). In addition, VMI provides the supplier 
with the opportunity to better manage its own production, inventory, 
and transportation costs. (See, for example, Qetinkaya and Lee, 2000). 
In- exchange, the buyer typically receives price discounts or improved 
terms of payment from the supplier. 
Quick Response (QR), was innovated by Milliken & Company (http: 
I l;r;rw .milliken. com) in the early 1990's and subsequently codified by 
the Voluntary Interindustry Commerce Standards (VICS) Association. 
QR has four levels of application and technology. Levels 1 and 2, for 
example, involve retailer inventory-status information-sharing and au-
tomatic order-processing between retailer and supplier. Levels 3 and 4 
include VMI and cross-docking warehouses. See Fiorito et al., 1994 for 
more information. 
Although VMI and QR might be the "best-known" management sys-
tems among both practitioners and academics 1 perhaps the most highly-
regarded systems are proprietary systems developed by large retailers) 
such as Wal-Mart's RetailLink, Kmart's Workbench, and Target's Part-
ners Online. Although the detailed inner workings of these systems are 
closely-guarded secrets, they all have two common characteristics: (1) 
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the sharing of transactions-level data between among partners; and (2) 
the use of agreed-upon metrics (c.g. 1 in-stock, inventory-turnover and, 
on-time delivery measures) and targets to assess partner performance. 
RetailLink, for example, captures sales,· inventory, and delivery-related 
data for every SKU at every Wal-Mart facility (i.e., store and distri-
bution center) and uploads it to a central database at least every 24 
hours. These data, and metrics based upon them, are made available to 
every manager and every company up or down the supply chain whose 
performance is related to this SKU. 
How this shared information is used - in particular, whether the de-
cisions based on it are made centrally or decentrally - depends on the 
specific partnership agreement, and the type of product(s) being man-
aged. Similarly, who does the implementation and how it is done is 
specific to the partnership and product(s ). To illustrate: Wal-Mart gen-
erally centralizes decision-making but decentralizes implementation for 
Wal-Mart and Sam's Club facilities, while delegating decision-making 
and implementation to its suppliers. However1 regardless of who makes 
or implements the decisions, the quality of the decisions and their im-. 
plementation are continually monitored by all parties and compared to 
the agreed-upon targets. 
Before taking a closer look at current supply-chain practice1 I will 
introduce a simple paradigm that will be useful in interpreting it. 
3. Information, Decision, Implementation, and 
Buffer (IDIB) systems 
Managing anything, including managing a supply chain, can be viewed 
as four related activities: (1) getting information for decision-making; 
(2) decision-making; (3) implementing decisions; and (4) buffering a-
gainst imperfections in (1)-(3). Correspondingly, every organization has 
systems for performing these four activities. 
The Information system 
The role of the "information system:' is to provide past, present, and 
future-oriented information for decision making. This information might 
be about demand, costs, materials, capacities1 etc. An ideal Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) system should be capable of capturing and 
providing all this information. In practice, however, information "in the 
information system" is captured and stored in dozens of different ways 1 
among them paper records and computer tapes. In many organizationS1 
much of this information is: literally, in·the heads of management per-
sonnel. 
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· Hence) a firm :s infonp.ation system is the less "~ thing" and more 
a collection of "things": the collection of all business processes - for-
mal and informal - plus all the information technologies and systems 
that provide infonllation for decision-making. In this sense, information 
systems are "decision-support systems". However, I prefer the label "in-
formation system'' since most decision-support systems are limited in 
their domain, and,· hence, are a subset of the information system. 
The overall quality of an information system's information about any-
thing can be measured as spme combination of: (1) its accuracy, that is, 
the correspondence between past, present, and future reality and what 
the information system reports (or reported) about it; (2) its leadtime; 
i.e., the time between an event and when the information system reports 
it; (3) its level of aggregation; i.e., the categories and units in which in-
formation is provided; and (4) its horizon; i.e., how far into the future 
(or past) the information system looks. 
At their worst, information systems provide grossly inaccurate, even 
irrelevant, information. ''Better" information systems typically provide 
some historical information and some current-status information. Still 
better information systems provide future-oriented information, such as 
demand forecasts and cost projections. A "perfect" information system 
would be the proverbial crystal ball, capable of seeing perfectly into the 
past, present, or future. 
Another important characteristic of a company's information system 
is its cost; that is, the cost of the people, equipment, facilities, and 
processes that, together, comprise the information system. Typically, for 
a given technology, the cost of an information system is an increasing, 
and marginally-increasing function of its overall quality. In other words, 
improving a given information system costs more, and each additional 
increment in quality costs more than the last. 
From a management perspective, of course, the value of an informa-
tion system doesn't depend on the quality of the information it provides, 
but on the quality of the decisions made based on this information. 
The Decision-Making system 
The role of a decision-making system1 of course, is to make decisions 
using the information provided by the information system. Decision-
making takes many different forms and is performed by many different 
individuals or groups. Decision-making occurs throughout every orga-
nization, from the shop-floor to the executive suite. Strategic decisions 
(e.g., the organization of the supply-chain, product offerings) are typi-
cally made at the executive level. Managerial decisions (e.g., the mas-
ter schedule, order-promising) are typically made by middle managers. 
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Tactical decisions (e.g. 1 processor assignment, workload sequencing) are 
typically delegated to the shop floor. The decision-making processes 
themselves might be informal, even intuitive (e.g., "Ned uses his 25 years 
of experience to assign workloads to processors), or they might be codi-
fied, even regulated. For example, in US pharmaceutical manufacturing, 
most of the production decisions {e.g., the process steps and lot sizes) 
have been specified and FDA approved and, hence, must be adhered 
to. The corresponding decision rules might be simple - for example, in 
master-scheduling ''run-out rules" are often used- or mathematically so-
phisticated (e.g., master-schedule optimization using mathematical pro-
gramming). The decision-rules might be formal and automated; or, they 
might be totally within the head of some individual or group of individ-
uals. Typically, important decisions are the result of a complex set of 
activities; some logical or based on management judgment, some simply 
guess-work. 
The overall quality of a decision-making system's decisions can be 
measured as some combination of: {!) the optimality of the decisions 
made; and {2) the decision-making leadtime. "Optimality" means how 
desirable the decision is - given the quality of information provided by 
the information system - with respect to cost, profit, or some other 
measure of utility. The "decision-making leadtime" is the amount of 
time it takes to make the decision once the appropriate information has 
been provided. This lead time might be short or long; it might he a fixed 
amount of time, or variable; it might be known or unknown in advance. 
Like information systems, the cost-drivers for decision-making systems 
are the people, equipment, facilities, and processes that, together, com-
prise it. And, like information systems, for a given technology, the cost 
of a decision-making system is typically an increasing, and marginally-
increasing function of its overall quality. In other words, improving a 
given decision-making system costs more, and each additional increment 
in quality- for example, each increment in the desirability of its decisions 
or each decrease in leadtime - costs more than the last. 
Finally, like information systems, the value of a decision-making sys-
tem doesn't depend only on its quality characteristics. In particular, a 
"perfecf' decision that doesn't get implemented is of no value. 
The Implementation system 
Implementation usually involves some "paperwork'' to authorize or ini-
tiate activity. For example, a decision to ship 200 units from Dock 4 at 
12 o'clock on April 5th, will typically involve inventory-withdrawal au-
thorizations, transportation requisitions, etc. Often, some preliminary 
actions must also be taken. For example, if 200 units aren't in inven-
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tory: then production decisions and their corresponding implementations 
must take place. 
The overall quality of an implementation system can be measured as 
some combination of: (1) the implementation leadtime; and (2) imple-
mentation accuracy. The "implementation leadtime1' is the amount of 
time required to make the decision happen; in other words, the time 
between making the decision and having the corresponding actions com-
pleted (i.e., implemented). For example, the amount of time it actually 
takes to ship the 200 units from Dock 4 once the decision has been 
made to do it. Like decision-making leadtimes, implementation lead-
times might be short or long, fixed or variable, known or unknown in 
advance. "Implementation accuracy" measures how closely the imple-
mentation matches the decision. Perfect accuracy means that the im-
plementation perfectly matched the decision; for example, that exactly 
200 units were shipped from Dock 4 at 12 o'clock on April 5th In prac-
tice, implementation is seldom perfect: differences may be small, as in a 
tightly-controlled JIT system, or large, as in high-density chip fabrica-
tion1 where yield losses are unpredictable and difficult to control. 
Often trade-offs occur between the implementation lead time and the 
accuracy-of-implementation. The phrase "quick-and-dirty'', for exam-
ple, means that decision-making and implementation are "quick" (i.e., 
that their combined leadtime is short) but that the decision and/or its 
implementation are "dirty" (i.e., that the decision isn't very desirable 
and/or the implementation isn't accurate) 1 
Like information and decision-making systems: implementation sys-
tems cost money; that is, the cost of the people, equipment, facilities, 
and processes that involve making the decision happen. And, like in-
formation and decision-making systems, for a given level of technology, 
the cost of an implementation system is typically an increasing, and 
marginally-increasing function of its overall quality. In other words, im-
proving a given implementation system - that is, making it faster or 
more accurate - costs more, and each additional increment in quality 
costs more than the last. 
The Buffer system 
In a perfect world, information systems would provide perfect informa-
tion and decision-making systems would make perfect decisions. Imple-
mentation would be perfect, too. However, in the real world, none of 
11n fact, decision-making and implementation are often iterative. For example, a decision 
might be made; then, during the process of implementation, new information is revealed that 
might lead to modifying the decision, etc. 
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these three systems is ever perfect. Management systems compensate 
for these imperfections using buffers and buffer systems. 
\Vhat are buffers? Unlike information, decision-making, and imple-
mentation systems, which can re realized in a virtual infinity of different 
forms: buffers come in only three basic forms: inventory: leadtime 1 and 
capacity. A "'buffer system" is a combination of inventory, leadtime: 
and capacity buffers, in various amounts, located within what might 
be called the "management-system supply chain". Often, for example, 
inflated leadtimes or extra capacity are imbedded in the information, 
decision-making, and implementation systems. Work-in-process inven-
tories are typically found throughout the implementation system: with 
raw-material inventories at the beginning and finished goods at the end 
of the implementation chain. Leadtime buffers (e.g., inflated promise 
dates) are typically found at the interface between the points of delivery 
and the customers. 
Re-thinking buffers 
The best way to understand - indeed, appreciate -the roles that buffers 
play in a management system is this: forget everything you've thought 
about them until now. In particular, put aside any notion that buffers 
are inherently "bad:'. 
Yes1 buffers are often thought to be "bad'
1
• Why? Perhaps ies bec~use 
buffers cost money. Yet: the other three components of a management 
system cost money, too. It is also worth noting- and peculiar, I think-
that despite the fact that information, decision-making, and implemen-
tation systems also cost money, these three elements of a management 
system axe generally thought to be "good". Further, it is generally 
accepted that ~~improving'1 - that is, increasing the capabilities - of 
an information, decision-making, or implementation system is a "good 
thing". On the other hand, it is generally thought that "improving a 
buffer" must mean reducing its _capabilities or elimiriating it. Put this 
notion aside, too. 
Another rea.son why buffer systems might be thought to be "bad" is 
that whatever amount of buffering management chooses to provide, it is 
typically the wrong amount. In other words, the amount of buffering is 
either too much - for example, leftover inventory at the end of a selling 
season - or not enough - for example, that sales were lost despite the 
fact that ~~lots" of safety stock was provided. 
I believe it is more useful - and accurate - to think about buffers in 
terms of the role they play in an management system: to compensate for 
imperfections in the information, decision-making, and implementation 
systems. From this perspective, I believe that buffers can only rightfully 
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be called "too big" if they overly, or unnecessarily, fail to do what they 
are intended to do: to compensate for imperfections elsewhere in the 
management system. Similarly, buffers should only be thought of a.s 
"bad" if they imperfectly compensate for those imperfections. 
What would a "perfect" amount of buffering be? 
Consider a business scenario like that of the newsvendor model, and a 
management system whose information system, I, perfectly forecast cus-
tomer demand. Assume that this perfect forecast is provided to decision-
making, D, and implementation, I, systems that are capable of providing 
exactly this number of units at the instant they are demanded in pre-
cisely the right quantity. How much buffering, B, is required to perfectly 
satisfy customer demand? None. In other words, the "perfect" amount 
of buffering in this system is zero. 
Now change the management system slightly so that the information 
system can only provide a probability distribution of future demand. 
Given this level of imperfection in the information system, is any man-
agement system capable of always satisfying customer demand without 
lost sales or unused inventory, capacity, or leadtime? 
The answer is 'tyes", provided that the decision-making and imple-
mentation systems are perfect; that is, provided that, once demand is 
known, management is capable of deciding to provide this amount, and 
provided that ·the implementation system is capable of producing pre-
cisely this amount instantaneously. Here, too, the perfect amount of 
buffering would be zero. On the other hand, unless the decision-making 
and implementation systems are perfect, some buffering will be required. 
How much and what kind of buffering? 
Suppose that the "IDL systems" - that is, the combined informa-
tion, decision-making, and implementation systems - are perfect with 
respect to leadtime, but imperfect with respect to quantity. In other 
words, some amount will be provided at exactly the right time to sat-
isfy demand, but that the quantity won't necessarily equal the quantity 
demanded. In order to avoid lost sales, inventory buffering will be re-
quired, the amount depending on the overall imperfection, or variance, 
in the quantity the IDL provides. As the variance of this imperfection 
increases, in order to compensate the corresponding amount of buffer 
inventory must also increase. In the extreme, as this variance increases 
to infinity, the "perfect" amount of buffering also increases to infinity. 
Next, suppose that IDL systems above are imperfect in quantity and 
leadtime. In order to satisfy demand at the time that it occurs in the 
quantity demanded, a leadtime buffer must be added tc the inventory 
buffer. And, as the uncertainty in "supply leadtime" increases, the cor-
responding leadtime buffer must also increase. 
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Finally, since in many situations, the uncertainty arising from the IDL 
systems is a consequence of scheduling conflicts on some constrained re-
source(s), capacity buffers can usually be substituted for some of the 
inventory and lead time buffers. Hence, the appropriate forms of buffer-
ing ~ inventory, leadtime, or capacity - depends on the nature of the 
imperfection(s) in the IDL systems. 
Finally, then, given some form of buffering, what is the "perfece' 
amount? 
The "perfect" amount of buffering? 
If the role of the management system - the !DIE - is to provide what 
is required or demanded at the time and in the quantity that's required 
or demanded; and if the role of a buffer is to compensate for imper-
fections in the IDL systems, then the "perfecf' amount of leadtime, 
capacity, or inventory is the amount that does just that and no more: 
the amo~nt that provides precisely what's required or demanded despite 
the imperfections in the IDL systems. Hence, the "perfecf' amount of 
buffering is never zero unless the IDL systems are capable of perfection. 
Furthermore, as the combined imperfections in the IDL increases, the 
corresponding perfect amount of buffering must also increase. 
An aside on the "Zero Inventory" concept often associated with Ju~t-in­
Time systems: The concept of zero inventory, or, more generally, zero 
buffering can be an extremely important in identifying the nature and 
magnitude of imperfections in an IDL system. In other words, reduce 
the amount of buffering and "see" what imperfections are revealed. Of-
ten such experiments uncover imperfections in the IDL systems that are 
inexpensive to reduce or eliminate. If so, then this should be done and 
the corresponding amount of buffering should be permanently reduced. 
However, to the extent that imperfections in the IDL systems remain, 
the perfect amount of buffering isn't zero. 
Hence, the perfect amount of buffering depends on the imperfection 
in the combined IDL systems. If the amount of imperfection - that is, 
the uncertainties associated with the IDL systems - increases, then the 
overall level of buffering also must be "improved" - increased - in order 
to compensate. 
The cost of buffering 
Like all the other components of a management systems, the cost of 
an buffer system is typically an increasing, and marginally-increasing 
function of its overall quality. In other words, improving - that is, in-
creasing - the capability of any given buffer costs more, and, typically, 
each additional increment in quality costs more than the last. 
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An alterrtative perspective: the "optimal" amount of buffering 
The operations research (OR) paradigm provides an alternative perspec-
tive on buffers~ and, based on this perspective, defines the "optimar' 
amount of buffering. The perspective of the OR paradigm is as follows: 
The realized amount of buffering provided by a given management sys-
tem is the difference between what reality requires or demands and what 
the management system provides. For example, if demand was 100 units 
and the management system provided 120 units, then the buffer was 20 
units. Or, if management provided capacity of 40 hours and capacity of 
50 hours was required, then the buffer was -10 units. A negative buffer, 
whether its inventory, capacity, or leadtime, means that the manage-
ment system didn't provide enough of what was required or demanded; 
a positive buffer means that- too much was provided. 
Correspondingly, the OR paradigm takes the view that the cost of the 
buffer system is the cost of all the positive buffering, plus all the costs 
associated with negative buffering. In other words, the cost of the buffer 
system is the cost of all the unused inventory, capacity, and leadtime 
that the management system provided - measured after demand for 
that resource occurs - plus the cost of all the corresponding shortages of 
inventory, capacity, and leadtime. (e.g., lost sales, backorder, goodwill 
cost). 
The newsvendor model is, perhaps, the best-known example of the 
OR paradigm. The newsvendor model chooses the optimal "target in-
ventory" based on three "drivers": the per-unit cost of "not enough" 
buffering (i.e., opportunity cost of lost sales), the per-unit cost of "too-
much buffering" (i.e., the out-of-pocket leftover cost), and the probabil-
ity distribution of demand. The expected-cost minimizing target inven-
tory is provided by the well-known "newsvendor fractile'' of the cumula-
tive demand distribution. The corresponding "safety-stock" (inventory) 
buffer is measured, a priori, as the difference between the chosen target 
inventory and the expected customer demand. 
What's wrong with the OR paradigm's view of buffers? 
There is nOthing "wrong" with the OR paradigm or with its view of 
buffers. "Near-sighted" would be a better description. 
In particular, the OR-paradigm's view of the too-much and not-enough 
costs associated with the imperfections of a management system is con-
sistent with the IDIB-paradigm perspective. In other words, once, say, 
demand occurs, the relevant costs incurred because of an imperfect IDIB 
are those associated with providing too much or not enough of whatever 
was demanded. 
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But why should these too-much and not-enough costs only be associ-
ated with- if you will: "blamed:' on- the buffer system? Yes, buffers 
are typically imperfect, but what about the imperfections in the IDL 
systems? More -on this below. 
One way of looking at the difference between the OR and the !DIE 
paradigms is that the IDIB paradigm generalizes the OR paradigm. 
Specifically, the IDIB paradigm takes the view that the quality of all 
four components of a management system - not just the buffer system 
quality (i.e., size) - are decision variables; second, that the underlying 
quality-cost function for each of these components - that is, the cost to 
move them in the direction of perfection - is increasing and marginally 
increasing. Finally: that there is a cost associated with the entire IDIB 
portfolio- again, not just the buffer system- for failing to provide what-
ever is required or demanded. Hence, the "optimal" IDIB is the IDIB 
that minimizes the total costs of all of its components plus the cost of 
failing to provide whatever is required or demanded. 
From this point of view, the OR paradigm is "ncar-sighted" to the 
extent that it takes the IDL as fixed, and focuses only on picking the 
amount of buffering that minimizes the corresponding too-much and 
not-enough buffer cost. 
We will address the question of the optimal IDIB in Section 11. We 
turn now to the concept of the "!DIE Portfolio". 
4. The IDIB portfolio 
I label the combination of these four components of a management 
system - the information, decision-making, implementation, and buffer 
systems - a "portfolio", because, like a financial portfolio, each of these 
systems involves an investment of dollars. And, like the performance 
of an investment portfolio, the performance of a management system 
depends on how well its components perform in combination, not as 
separate components. Finally, in assembling an IDIB Portfolio, as in 
assembling a financial portfolio, an almost unlimited number of combi-
nations can be chosen. As an illustration, suppose the goal is to manage 
a supply chain to provide a 95% customer fill-rate at the retail level. 
This might be provided by managing every link of the chain with low-
quality information, decision-making, and implementation systems, but 
large inventory buffers everywhere. Or, without changing the manage-
ment of the other links in this supply chain, the manufacturer might 
substitute buffer capacity for some of its finished-goods inventory and 
still offer the same service to the distributor. Similarly, the distributor 
might choose higher cost of express delivery (from the manufacturer) in 
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order to reduce the expediting and inventory-holding cost on its safety-
stock (buffer) inventory. Three different IDIB Portfolios all providing 
the same level of customer serviCe. 
Which is best? 
If the goal of a management system is to maximize profit: then the 
"best" IDIB Portfolio is the portfolio with the least total cost: that is, 
the total cost of all the people, facilities, equipment, and technology 
associated with providing information, making decisions, implementing 
them, and buffering to compensate for imperfections in the IDL systems, 
plus the cost of lost sales, expediting, and goodwill loss resulting from 
failing to do all this perfectly. 
Managing the IDIB portfolio 
"Managint' the IDIB Portfolio means making decisions about the nature 
and quality of its four components: the information, decision-making, 
implementation, and buffer systems. The ideal is to select the quality 
of each component, plus the cost of lost sales, etc., so that total cost 
is minimized. Is "managing the IDIB Portfolid' amenable to the tools 
of operations research? I think it could be, but most OR models are 
defined much too near-sightedly to be called "IDIB optimizers", much 
less, "IDIB improvers". 
Consider the well-known newsvendor inventory model. In this model, 
the information system provides the probability distribution of customer 
demand and estimates of the costs associated with buying and selling 
newspapers. Attention is focused on the decision about the number of 
newspapers to have on hand at the beginning of the day in order to max-
imize the newsvendor's expected profit. The optimal decision-rule is well 
known: set this inventory equal to the ''c~itical fractile1' of the probabil-
ity distribution of customer demand. The newsvendor's implementation 
leadtime is not explicitly considered. Instead, it is usually assumed that 
whatever this leadtime is: it is short enough so that, once the newsven-
dor has decided how much to order, the chosen quantity will be delivered 
on time. The basic newsvendor model also ignores implementation accu-
racy; that is, it is implicitly assumed that whatever quantity is ordered 
will be delivered. Extensions of the newsvendor model consider accu-
racy; that is: .the correspondence between what is ordered and what is 
delivered (See Karlin, 1958 and Ehrhardt and Taube, 1987, for example; 
see Yano and Lee, 1995 for other references). 
I believe the newsvendor model is representative of virtually every 
operations-research model of supply-chain management. That is, the 
quality of the information provided by the information system is as-
sumed to be fixed. The costs associated with the information, decision-
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making are typically ignored. The costs associated with implementation 
are sometimes represented: but in a highly-stylized manner. For ex-
ample, the only implementation cost associated with the newsvendor 
model is the marginal purchasing cost. Similarly, the only implemen-
tation cost associated with the .EOQ model is the assumed-to-be-fixed 
order cost. The goal, as described above, is to determine the decision-
rule that minimizes buffer-system cost. In !DIE Portfolio terms, the 
newsvendor model-like most supply-chain models- selects the decision-
rule for the decision-making system ("D'') that minimizes expected total 
buffer-system ( ''B11 ) cost for a fixed quality of information, "F. The im-
plementation "P is represented either as a cost or as a constraint; not 
as a decision-variable. 
"Managing the newsvendor's IDlE Portfolio" is much more complex. 
It does involve selecting decision rules, but the objective is to ffiinimize 
total portfolio cost, not just the cost of the buffer system. In particular, 
managing the newsvendor's IDIB also involves assessing the cost and 
value of an information system that would provide more (or, possibly, 
even less!) precise information about customer demand. It also involves 
assessing the cost and value of implementation systems with different 
leadtimes and accuracies. J\1ore broadly, managing the newsvendor's 
IDIB portfolio ·might involve fundamental changes in the newsvendor's 
operations. 
Suppose, for example, that the newsvendor· was able to make and 
implement her /his ordering decisions any number of times during the 
day and receive those newspapers instantaneously (i.e., decision and im-
plementation leadtimes of zero). In such a scenario, the newsvendor 
wouldn't inventory any newspapers, nor would he/she need a probabil-
ity distribution of demand. Instead, the newsvendor would wait until 
a customer requested a newspaper and then provide it upon demand. 
Sound far fetched? Consider this: 
For decades, the copier division of Xerox struggled with managing 
the inventory of owner's manuals for its copiers: how much inventory of 
which manuals to have on hand, and when to replenish this inventory. 
Xerox eliminated this problem by developing a system for printing and 
binding manuals upon demand; i.e., whenever assembly of a copier is 
scheduled, the printing of its manuals is also scheduled. 
How was this done? By developing a system for implementing the 
decision to produce manuals whose leadtime is less than or equal to the 
time required to implement the decision to assemble the copier. 
"Managing" the !DIE Portfolio is no easy task. First, the different 
components of the portfolio are often difficult to identify. For example, 
managers, who are nominally decision-makers, also often play a role in 
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the information system; line personnel~ who are nominally implementers~ 
have roles to play in information, decision-making, and buffering. So, it 
is often difficult to separate the components of a firm's IDIB portfolio. 
Second, many of the costs associated with a firm's IDIB portfolio are 
"overhead'' or "indirect" costs, which makes them difficult to estimate. 
These and other difficulties make it virtually impossible to find the truly 
optimal IDIB portfolio; that is, the portfolio of information, decision-
making, implementation, and buffering whose combined cost plus the 
cost of failing to provide enough of whatever was demanded or required 
(e.g., backordering or expediting cost) is the minimum possible cost. 
Nonetheless, it is often relatively easy to verify that one given IDIB 
portfolio has lower total cost than another. In the Xerox example above, 
it was relatively easy to verify, using back-of-the-envelope estimates, that 
Xerox's "new" portfolio was an order of magnitude less expensive than 
its old one. 
Xerox's old information sys.tem ignored the fact that Xerox manage-
ment decided which copiers to produce and when to produce them. In-
stead, it assumed that demand for a given manual was provided by a 
probability distribution. Xerox's new IDIB portfolio uses information 
that management has scheduled a given copier to be assembled, and 
then implements the decision to print its manuals in a short enough 
leadtime so that the manual can be packaged with the copier at the end 
of the assembly line. 
I believe that experienced operations researchers, practitioners, and 
consultants already recognize the tradeoffs that the IDIB Portfolio makes 
explicit. For example, consultants will often prescribe a less-than-perfect, 
heuristic decision-rule because it is less demanding of the information 
system and/ or easier to implement, particularly if these imperfections 
are relatively inexpensive to buffer against. On a broader level, sensi-
tivity analysis, which is a well-founded tool of the operations research 
theorist, can be viewed assessing ·the impact of imperfections in the qual-
ity of the information and/or decision-making systems on system per-
formance, and, hence, the level of buffering that might be required. For 
example, sensitivity analyses on the basic EOQ model can be viewed 
as assessing the sensitivity of lot-sizing decisions to inaccuracies (i.e., 
imperfections) in the information required to support it (e.g., estimates 
of company inventory-holding cost or set-ups). See Lowe and Schwarz, 
1983, for example. 
Similarly, but at a metaphysical level, operations-research theorists 
often prefer a less realistic (i.e.: less perfect) model to a more realistic, 
more perfect, model because of the insight its analysis provides. 
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From this point of view, the fundamental difference between the IDIB 
paradigm and the OR paradigm is that experienced operations researchers, 
practitioners, and consultants make these tradeoff a priori; that is 1 with-
out explicitly identifying all the alternative levels of quality in informa-
tion: decision-making, and implementation systems that might be cho-
sen. Although this is understandable, such a priori choices necessarily 
lead to locally, not globally optimal cboices for the corresponding IDIB 
portfolio. 
The role of information technology and economics 
What "happened" at Xerox that led to its development of a new IDIB 
portfolio for managing manuals? Was it management 1s "discoveri' that 
their own decisions created the demand for manuals? Not likely. 
Obviously, the availability of technology played a role: printing-and-
binding technology that could "quickly" produce an owner's manuaL In 
IDIB Portfolio terms, technology whose implementation leadtime was 
shorter than the implementation leadtime to assemble a copier. The 
other element 1 of course, is economics: Given that technology can facil-
itate a "new" IDIB portfolio, its adoption only makes sense if the total 
cost of the "new" portfolio is less than the total cost of the "old" port-
folio. So, obviously, technology and economics play a substantial role in 
the development of "new" IDIB portfolios. 
Given the proven success of information technology (e.g., micro- com-
puters and the internet) as a significant facilitator of improved infor-
mation, decision-making, and implementation, I believe it is inevitable 
that information technology will continue to create the opportunities 
for "new" IDIB portfolios. Further, to the extent that the cost of in-
formation technology continues to fall, following Moore's Law2 , these 
IDLsystems will continue to become less and less expensive. And, 
buffers, ~'B" s - inventory: capacity, and lead time - are, if anything, be-
coming more expensive over time. 
Hence, I believe information technology and economics will continue 
to offer IDIB portfolios to supply-chain managers whose total cost is 
2The observation made in 1965 by Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel, that the number of 
transistors per square inch on integrated circuits had doubled every year since the integrated 
circuit was invented. Moore predicted that this trend would continue for the foreseeable 
future. In subsequent years, the pace slowed down a bit, but data density has doubled 
approximately every 18 months, and this is the current definition of Moore's Law, which 
Moore himself has blessed. Most experts, including Moore himself, expect Moore's Law to 
hold for at least another two decades. Source: vebopedia.com (definition last modified in 
March, 1998). 
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less than today's"- The challenge to supply-chain managers is: Which 
new IDIB portfolio to adopt, and when to adopt it? The challenge to 
supply-chain modelers is: Wh<it techniques and models will aid managers 
in choosing new IDIB portfolios? 
5. An IDIB portfolio perspective on 
supply-chain management 
Until fairly recently, virtually every link of every real-world supply 
chain was managed using a very crude IDIB portfolio. Typically, the 
only information a buyer shared with its supplier was its current order; 
and the most information the supplier shared with the buyer was this or-
der's planned or promised shipping date. Status information (e.g., order 
status, inventory -status) and future-oriented information (e.g., planned 
orders and production) were seldom, if ever, shared, often because nei-
ther partner had easy access to its own information about them. Further, 
in those instances when one partner did have access to this information, 
the technology for sharing it either wasn't available or was very expen-
sive. As a consequence, supply-chain ('partners'' - if we can call them 
that - were figuratively blind to one another. In the absence of use-
ful supplier/customer information for decision-making, each "partner'' 
made decisions that were focused on what little information was avail-
able, typically, internally-focused information, such as processor utiliza-
tion, hot lists, etc. Consequently, the decision-making and implementa-
tion: based on this low-quality information required huge buffers: large 
buffer inventories {raw materials, wo.rk-in-process, and finished goods) 
plus buffer leadtimes and capacity. 
Given the high cost of these buffers, it's no surprise that when low-
cost technology for information-sharing between buyers and suppliers 
became available, innovators seized the opportunity to substitute low-
cost information-sharing for these high-cost buffers, thereby achieving 
significant improvements in performance and/ or reduced total cost. 
Wal-Mart, of course, must be credited with introducing many of the 
technological innovations {e.g., bar-coding, satellite communication of 
point-of-sale information) associated with contemporary supply-chain 
3 Although new technological capabilities are likely to be the primary drivers for changing an 
existing 1D1B Portfolio, at least in the short term, it is important to note that even if technol-
ogy were held constant, any significant change in the cost of one or more of the components of 
any given IDIB Portfolio is an equally-important driver. For example, holding everything else 
equal, a significant decrease in the cost of capital makes inventory and equipment buffering 
less expensive. Under these circumstances, increasing the quality of the buffer system and 
decreasing the quality of the corresponding information, decision-making or implementation 
system should reduce total cost. 
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management, and equally important, in demonstrating that substituting 
improved information for inventory and leadtime buffers reduced total 
cost. 
And, so the "revolution'' in supply-chain management began and con-
tinues today, the state-of-the-art represented by Wal-Mart's RetailLink 
system. 
Yet, what is really different about these systems? From an IDlE 
perspective, these innovations are actually fairly modest, at least in 
terms of what could be innovated. Under Vendor-Managed Inventory 
(VMI), for example, the buyer delegates the making and implementa-
tion of inventory-replenishment decisions to the vendor. In order to do 
so, the buyer's information system provides the vendor with information 
about customer demand and inventory status. Levels 1 and 2 of Quick 
Response (QR) are the same, with the addition of automatic order-
processing (i.e., implementation) between retailer and supplier. Levels 
3 and 4 of QR include cross-docking warehouses (i.e., faster implemen-
tation of warehousing decisions). Even Wal-Mart's RetailLink, although 
awesome in its scale (e.g. 1 in the level of detail provided, with the type 
and number of partners with access to it), is fundamentally: (1) a sys-
tem for rapidly sharing transactions-level data and metrics about the 
past and the present with its suppliers; and (2) a centralized system for 
making and implementing decisions for its own facilities. 
So, why the "significant improvements" from what I describe as ~~mod­
est innovations"? There is an old saying that: "In the land of the blind, 
the one-eyed man is king". Historically, supply-chain "partnerS11 were 
figuratively blind to one another. Add just a little vision - for example, 
under QR, customer-demand and retailer-inventory information - and, 
suddenly, there is no need for much of the buffering that had been re-
quired in the ~'land of the blind". Reducing inventory produces cash. 
Reducing capacity increases productivity, and, hence, profitability. Re-
ducing leadtimes attracts more customers. 
Given the huge payoffs that supply-chain partners have derived from 
sharing a modest amount of information or from delegating some decision-
making and implementation from buyer to supplier, will more of the 
same yield even larger payoffs? Where will it end? Will it end? 
The "Axioms of the IDIB Portfolio" suggest that long before informa-
tion-sharing and/or delegation of decision-making and implementation 
becomes "totaP' between supply-chain partners - if it ever does - some-
thing even more revolutionary will happen. 
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6. The axioms of the IDIB portfolio 
The I'' Axiom of the IDIB Portfolio is this: Given an existing 
IDIB Portfolio, in~creasing the quality of one of its components 
facilitates decreasing the quality of one or more of its other 
three components while maintaining the same level of customer 
service {e.g., fill rate, leadtime). 
In an inventory-replenishment system, for example, reducing the lead-
time to implement a replenishment decision, facilitates decreasing the 
safety-stock inventory or leadtime buffer - that is, decreasing its quality 
- without affecting customer fill-rates, expected backorders, etc .. Or, 
in the same setting, decreasing the variance of the leadtime to make a 
replenishment decision by, say, one unit, facilitates increasing the cor-
responding implementation lead time variance by one unit.4 Many such 
tradeoffs are possible. 
Schneider National Trucking Company's innovation of satellite track-
ing to locate its trucks allowed Schneider to reduce two of its costly 
buffers while improving customer service. Here are some details: 
Before introducing its satellite-based information system for locating 
its thousands of trucks, Schneider dispatchers relied on periodic tele-
phone calls from its drivers in order to learn where its trucks and drivers 
were. The corresponding uncertainty about where and when its own 
trucks would be available led to inflated promised pick-up times to cus-
tomers and to a significant amount of idle capacity (i.e., "deadheading'', 
which is a truck moving without a load). In other words, in the absence 
of accurate information about the location of its own trucks, Schneider 
buffered itself using leadtime and capacity. By adopting its satellite-
tracking system, Schneider was able to reduce both these buffers and 
offer improved delivery performance. 
The 1"' Axiom of the IDIB Portfolio might be called the "trade-off 
axiom"; that is, by incurring increased cost for higher quality in one 
component of the IDIB Portfolio it should be possible to reduce the 
quality and cost of another component. If the cost reduction is larger 
than the cost increase, then total portfolio cost has been reduced. Further, 
as is often the case, some of the net savings can be invested in improving 
competitiveness (e.g., increasing fill-rates, reducing delivery leadtimes, 
offering higher levels of customization, reducing prices). 
Other trade-offs are possible, too. For example: a make-to-stock man-
ufacturer who has made the transition from a "push" management sys-
4 Assuming these processes are independent the same safety stock will provide the same 
customer fill-rate, etc. 
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tem (e.g., MRP) to a "pull" management system (e.g., JIT) has, ev-
erything else being equal: chosen to substitute buffer capacity for buffer 
inventory (and: often, to shift the inventory-buffering responsibilities to 
its suppliers and/or customers). 
Sometimes, trade-offs are made to increase buffers. One example of 
this, experienced by every supply-chain manager who has replaced a do-
mestic supplier with a lower-cost international supplier, is the increase 
in safety-stock inventory necessitated by the less-reliable transportation. 
lead times from the off-shore supplier. In such cases, of course, the cost 
saving in implementation (i.e., delivery of items ordered from the sup-
plier) isn't typically in transportation- indeed, transportation cost may 
increase - but in the cost of acquiring the materials themselves. 
I believe that virtually all of the dramatic improvements reported by 
companies in managing their own internal .supply chains or by compa-
nies and their partners in managing their shared supply chains can be 
interpreted ~ indeed, could have been forecast - using the pt Axiom of 
the IDIB Portfolio. That is, given the reduced cost of a "bettee' infor-
mation system (as provided by innovations in information technology) 
and the already high cost of buffering, that information could be substi-
tuted for buffers - that is, information improved in quality and buffering 
reduced in quality5 ~ without reducing customer service and at reduced 
total cost. 
What the 1st Axiom doesn't suggest is the magnitude of improvement 
in cash position, productivity, and competitiveness that so many part-
ners have reported. This magnitude, of course, depends on the cost of 
the buffering required by being "blind" and how much of a buffer reduc-
tion (i.e., reduced inventory, capacity, and/or leadtime) a little "vision" 
provides. 
So, will the future of supply-chain management involve even more 
extensive information-sharing or delegation of decision-making and im-
plementation between supply-chain partners? The 2nd Axiom suggests 
some more, but, depending on the partnership, perhaps not a great deal 
more. 
The "2nd Axiom of the IDIB Portfolio" is this: Investment to im-
prove the quality of any single component of an IDIB Portfolio 
will, over some range, decrease the total cost of the portfolio; 
but, beyond some quality level, increase the total cost of the 
portfolio. 
5Recall that, everything else being equal, reducing the amount of buffering reduces its capa-
bility to compensate for imperfections. Hence, reducing the amount of buffering reduces its 
"quality". 
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Although "axioms1' are supposed to be self-evident, a little discussion 
of the 2nd Axiom is appropriate. The 2nd Axiom considers what hap-
pens to total portfolio cost if one varies the quality level of any single 
component of an IDIB Portfolio and adjusts the quality levels of the 
other three components to- minimize the corresponding total portfolio 
cost. For example, consider varying the quality of implementation in 
some existing IDIB Portfolio. Applied to this example, the first half 
of the proposition is that if implementation is very low in quality, for 
example, that implementation lead time has a large mean and variance, 
or that the accuracy of implementation is poor, then the total cost of 
this IDIB Portfolio can be reduced by: (1) increasing the quality of 
implementation; and (2) reducing the quality of the corresponding in-
formation and/or decision-making systems, and/or reducing the amount 
of buffering {e.g., leadtime, capacity, or inventory) 
The support for this proposition is that the cost of any of the four com-
ponents of an IDIB Portfolio is an increasing and marginally-increasing 
function of its quality. In this instance, the proposition is that the cost 
of a low-quality implementation system is small, and that the cost to 
improve its quality is low compared to the high cost of the information, 
decision-making, and buffer systems required to work in combination 
with it. :More specifically, given a low-quality implementation system, 
management would probably have been forced a very high-cost buffer 
system, possibly one with large inventories, or possibly one with large 
leadtime and/or capacity buffers. Hence, improving the quality of im-
plementation - which should cost relatively little - and reducing the 
quality of its buffer system -which should save relatively more - will 
reduce total portfolio cost. 
The second half of the proposition is that continuing to improve the 
quality of any single component and, correspondingly, decreasing the 
quality of one or more of the other three components of an IDIB Port-
folio will, beyond some point, increase total portfolio cost. The support 
for this proposition, again, is that the cost of any of the four compo-
nents of an IDIB Portfolio is an increasing and marginally-increasing 
function of its quality. In terms of the example, the proposition is that 
if the implementation system is already operating at a very high level of 
quality - e.g., nearly immediate, nearly perfect implementation - then 
the cost of any incremental improvement will be large relative to the 
savings generated by the corresponding decreases in the quality levels 
of buffering, information, or decision-making that this improvement in 
implementation facilitates. 
The 2nd Axiom might be called the "golden mean" axiom; that is, it 
doesn't make sense to invest too much in improving a single component 
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of the IDIB Portfolio without making corresponding improvements in its 
other components. 
7. The future of supply-chain management 
Given that the current state-of-the-art in supply-chain management 
involves some, perhaps even a great deal 1 of information sharing and 
some delegation of decision-making and implementation, the axioms sug-
gest that even if the net savings from more information-sharing and 
delegation is positive, some other change in the IDIB Portfolio may 
yield larger net savings. In other words1 the question is not whether 
more information-sharing or more delegated decision-making or more 
delegated implementation will reduce total portfolio cost. Instead 1 the 
question is: Which changes in which components of the supply chain's 
IDIB Portfolio will facilitate the largest reduction in total portfolio cost? 
I believe that the most likely candidates for large net cost savings 
is in collaborative decision-making and/or collaborative implementation. 
What's "collaborative''? 
Broadly speaking "collaborative'' and "shared'' mean the same thing, 
but I use the word "collaborative11 in order to make an important distinc-
tion between visibility and participation. 1'Shared information'' is about 
visibility: that is, within some given domain, all the partners "see'' the 
same thing. Hence, "shared'' decision-making or ''shared" implementa-
tion might be interpreted to mean decision-making or implementation 
that is visible to all the partners. Although such visibility is impor-
tant, participating in decision-making or participating in implementa-
tion means something much more significant. Participation means that 
both partners' objective functiOns, constraints 1 and relative capabilities 
are considered. From an operations-research perspective, collaborative 
decision-making and implementation involve joint optimization 1 not in-
dependent optimization. 
The 2nd Axiom suggests that if partners are doing little or no collab-
orative decision-making or implementation: then it is possible that the 
greatest potential for improvement is in precisely these areas. Moreover, 
the higher quality of the components of the supply chain's IDIB portfolio 
is in other respects, the more likely shared decision-making and imple-
mentation are to provide the most significant total cost reductions.6 
6 1n addition, independent decision-making based on the same information, or delegated 
decision-making and implementation, at best, yield locally-optimal decisions and actions. 
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The IDIB portfolio, The Goal, and the Theory of Constraints 
In his ground-breaking book, The Goal (Goldratt and Cox, 1985), Eli 
Goldratt introduced the concept of bottlenecks in a firm's production 
capacity that limit its "throughpuf'; i.e., the rate at which a production 
system generates money through sales. From the perspective of the 
JDIB paradigm, throughput is a dollar-oriented quality characteristic 
of a firm's implementation (i.e., production) system. Correspondingly, 
Goldratt 's bottleneck concept is that this quality characteristic - the 
capability of the implementation system to generate dollars through sales 
- is limited by the bottleneck process( es) internal to the implementation 
system. 
Of course, a firm's implementation system doesn't generate through-
put all by itself. Decisions must be made about what to produce, when 
to produce it, etc. This is the role of the decision-making system. And, 
in order to make decisions, the decision-making system requires informa-
tion that's provided by the information system. Finally, buffer systems 
are there to provide throughput by compensating for whatever imper-
fections might exist in the IDL systems. In other words, it is a firm's 
entire JDIB portfolio that generates money through sales, not just its 
implementation system. 
Although Goldratt doesn't recognize the IDIB Portfolio explicitly, his 
prescriptions most certainly apply to it. For example, Goldratt pre-
scribes that decision-making in the management system should be fo-
cused on the "drum'' of the implementation-system's bottleneck(s) and 
the "ropes" that feed it. Goldratt also has prescriptions about the 
form, location, and amount of buffering that should be provided7, and 
about the nature of the information systemss management should use 
in decision-making. In brief, Goldratt recommends that all four compo-
nents of a firm's IDIB portfolio should be focused on the supply (and 
demand) bottlenecks. Hence, the IDIB paradigm and the bottleneck 
paradigm are consistent, indeed, complementary, to one another. 
Specifically, I believe that the IDIB paradigm enriches the paradigm 
of The Goal in several ways. For example, the IDIB paradigm suggests 
that the "goal" of making money can be achieved by virtually unlimited 
number of different IDIB portfolios, each component contributing in its 
characteristic way (i.e., gathering information, making decisions, etc.), 
each imperfect in different ways, and each compensating for imperfec-
7For example, buffer inventory in front of bottlenecks and buffer leadtimes to protect delivery 
dates. 
ssee Goldratt, 1991. 
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tions in the others. Second, of course, that the quality of each of these 
components is a decision variable. 
Next, recall that Goldratt points out that the only guaranteed way 
for a firm to. make money is to simultaneously increase throughput and 
reduce "'inventori' and "operating expenses" .9 However, Goldratt offers 
relatively little guidance about how to reduce inventory and operating 
expense, much less minimize them. The IDIB paradigm suggests how: 
select the least total cost IDIB portfolio. In other words, since most of a 
.firm's operating expenses are driven by management's chosen IDL sys-
tems and most of its inventory is in itS safety-stock and capacity buffers, 
by carefully choosing its IDIB portfolio management will minimize its 
combined operating expenses and inventory 
Finally, note that the "bottleneck'' concept is imbedded in the 2nd 
Axiom. Here's how: Consider a company with medium-to-high quality 
decision-making and implementation systems, but a low-quality infor-
mation system. Under these circumstances, the overall quality of this 
company 1s IDL systems is limited by its low-quality information-system. 
According to the znd Axiom, if this company invests in a better infor-
mation system, the overall quality of its IDL systems will improve. This 
improvement facilitates the reduction in its associated buffers. Given 
some (low) range of information-system quality, the effect should be to 
reduce the total cost of this company's IDIB portfolio. 
Next, consider a company with an excellent implementation system, 
say a state-of-the-art cellular system, but with mediocre-quality infor-
mation and decision-making systems. Additional improvement in this 
company's implementation system will yield an improvement in its over-
all IDL systems, and facilitate a reduction of the corresponding buffers. 
However, the money saved on the buffer system may be less than the 
additional cost of the improved implementation system. The result is 
an increase in total portfolio cost. 
From Goldratt 's viewpoint, the ''bottleneck'' in the quality of first 
company's IDL systems is its information system: a dollar invested there 
yielded more than a dollar saved on the buffer system, thereby reducing 
the firm's total inventory and operating expenses. On_ the other hand, 
the "bottlenecle' in the quality of second company's IDL systems wasn't 
its implementation system. Hence, a dollar invested there is a dollar 
wasted.10 
9 According to Goldratt, "inventory" is the dollars that a firm has invested in -things that 
it intends to sell, while operating expense is the cost of things that fir finn does to turn 
inventory into throughput. 
100f course, neither of these improvements, whether they would reduce its total IDIB port-
folio cost or not, necessarily increases the company's throughput. Throughput would only be 
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The future is wow for some supply-chain partners 
Some supply-chain partners are already sharing decision-making. Since 
1995, Heineken USA, Inc. and its independent distributors have been 
sharing information and decision-niaking about the replenishment of 
Heineken's beer products under a system called HOPS: the Heinekcn Op-
erational Planning System (http: I /64.158.250 .111/news/heineken. 
html and http: I /64.158.250 .111/news/archi ve99/06091999 .html). 
Intel and its customer computer-assemblers (e.g., IBM, Dell, Compaq) 
have been using a collaborative information- sharing and decision-making 
system to manage the assembler's inventories of computer chips under 
Intel's Supply-Line Management (SLM) program. 
One well-known and widely-implemented system for information-sha-
ring and collaborative decision-making in supply chains is Collaborative 
Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR). 
8. Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and 
Replenishment (CPFR) 
CPFR is a process model, shared by a buyer and supplier, through 
which inventory-status, forecast-, and promotion-oriented information 
are shared and replenishment decisions are made. In IDIB Portfolio 
terms, a process model for sharing information and decision-making be-
tween a buyer and supplier. 
CPFR began with a pilot program between Wal-Mart and Warner-
Lambert, called CFAR: "Collaborative Forecasting and Replenishment". 
In 1997, the Voluntary Interindustry Commerce Standards (VICS) Asso-
ciation (http: I /vies. or g) developed the "CPFR Initiative" (http: I I 
www. cpfr. org). In 1998, VICS published the first "CPFR Guidelines" 
(http: I;.,.,. cpfr. org/Guidelines .html). Since then, a large num-
ber of partners have developed CPFR pilots. Appendix 1 provides a 
partial list. Several partnerships have subsequently adopted CPFR as a 
standard way of doing business with one another. 
The CPFR process 
CPFR consists of 9 process steps, as follows: 
Step 1. Develop Front-End Agreement: Roles, Measurement, Readi-
ness 
increased if the changes to the entire IDIB portfolio increase avaHability or other.vise make 
the company's products more competitive. Nonetheless, even if throughput isn't increased, 
reducing the total IDIB portfolio cost reduces a company's operating expense, which increases 
profits; i.e., makes more money. . 
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Step 2. Create Joint Business Plan: Strategies and Tactics 
Step 3. Create Sales Forecasts; Buyer and supplier both create custo-
mer-demand forecasts 
Step 4. Identify Exceptions in Sales Forecasts 
Step 5. Resolve Exceptions: Agree on single forecast or agree to dis-
agree 
Step 6. Create Order Forecasts: Buyer and supplier both create plans 
for buyer orders 
Step 7. Identify Exceptions in Order Forecasts 
Step 8. Resolve Exceptions: Agree on single plan for buyer orders 
Step 9. Order Generation 
More details about these steps and the roles of the buyer and supplier 
in each step are provided in Figure 1.1 and at the VICS CPFR website 
(http: I /www. cpfr. or g). However, the basics of CPFR are straightfor-
ward: First, the partners share information about demand. If the buyer 
is a retailer - and so far, most buyers using CPFR are retailers, then 
demand is retail customer demand. If the buyer is a manufacturer or 
assembler then demand is generated by the manufacturer or assembler's 
trial master-production schedule. Then, significant differences between 
the buyer's and seller's demand forecast, labeled "exceptions, are dis-
cussed and resolved. These are Steps 3-5 above. Then, buyer and sup-
plier share plans for orders that the buyer will place with the supplier, 
based on the shared demand forecasts. Again, exceptions are identified 
and resolved (Steps 6-8). Subsequently, using the shared order plan, 
actual orders are generated (Step 9). The foundation for Steps 3-9 is 
the so-called "front-end agreement", under which the roles of the buyer 
and supplier and their capabilities to perform these roles are assessed. 
In this step, targeted performance and measures are also adopted. In 
Step 2, specific strategies and tactics are specified in detail. 
The benefits reported by CPFR partners, as might be predicted by 
the axioms, are increased inventory turns (i.e.: lower buffer inventory) 
and increased fill-rates for the SKU's involved; that is, higher levels of 
customer service. 
Several consulting firms offer software systems and support for CPFR, 
among them Logility, Inc. (http://www .logility. com) and Syncra Sys-
tems, Inc. (http://www.syncrasystems.com). CPFR is also being im-
plemented on B2B exchanges such as Worldwide Retail Net, Transora, 
and NetXchange. 
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Figure 1.1. The 9-Step CPFR Process. 
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Based on the success of CPFR between single buyer-supplier pairs, 
thought leaders in CPFR have suggested its extension to include collab-
oration with the carrier that transports goods between the buyer and 
supplier. This is called "CTM'': Collaborative Transportation Manage-
ment. (http: I I""". cpfr. orgiWhi tePapersiCTMwhi tepaper. pdf). It 
has also been suggested that in order to be truly successful, collabora-
tion should involve all of the links of a supply chain, under a scheme 
labeled "n-Tier Collaboration" (http: I lw"". cpfr. orgiWhi tePapersl 
nTierProposal. doc). Under such a scheme, for example, not only 
would Kimberly-Clark collaborate with Wal-Mart to plan Wal-Mart's 
orders of Kimberly-Clark products, but Kimberly-Clark would, in turn, 
collaborate with its suppliers to determine Kimberly-Clark's orders for 
materials for its paper products. So, in effect, Wal-Mart and Kimberly-
Clark's suppliers would be collaborating with Kimberly-Clark to deter-
mine plans to supply and order Kimberly-Clark's paper products. 
The challenges of CPFR 
Although CPFR has enormous potential for reducing the total cost of 
any supply chain's IDIB portfolio, there are also enormous challenges. 
At the most fundamental level, buyers and suppliers must develop trust 
that each will treat the other fairly and honestly. Prerequisite for this are 
incentives to do so. Again, see Cachon, 2004 for a review of the supply-
chain literature on the management of incentive conflicts with contracts. 
On a technical level, buyers and suppliers must develop a common lan-
guage for identifying products and making decisions about them. (See 
http:llwww.cpfr.orgiWhitePapersiCollaborationDataModelingA. 
pdf). Similarly, systems must be developed for linking the buyer's and 
supplier's business processes. This will involve a great deal of system 
change and training. Third, security protocols must be implemented 
that will safeguard both partners from leaks of proprietary information. 
Nonetheless, I believe that buyers and suppliers who find ways to 
overcome these challenges will achieve a competitive advantage, par-
ticularly for products that complete primarily on price and availability 
(e.g., consumer products). This advantage will either force the competi-
tors of CPFR partners to adopt similar techniques or force them out of 
business. 
9. Research topics in CPFR 
CPFR poses many interesting questions for supply-chain researchers, 
questions whose answers involve models that have yet to be developed. 
At the broadest level, there are questions involving the "drivers" for 
collaboration. For example, what are characteristics of buyers, suppliers, 
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and the environments in which they operate that promotes a desire on 
either of their parts to collaborate using CPFR? It is well known that 
agency losses occur in decentralized supply chains that involve hidden 
information and/ or hidden actions. What is less well known are the 
circumstances under which both the buyer and supplier will be better 
off by collaborating. See, for example, Monahan, 1984; Weng, 1995 and 
Taylor, 2001. In the absence of these circumstances ·or other incentives 
for collaboration, collaboration, in general 1 and CPFR, in particular, 
seem doomed. 
With respect to CPFR in particular, consider a buyer-supplier pair. 
Among the most interesting research questions are: First, how should the 
"front-endn agreement be structured in order to maximize - or merely1 
increase - the profits for both partners? What role will each partner 
play? How should performance improvement be measured? Perhaps 
most important, how should the benefits of improved performance be 
shared between the buyer and the supplier so that both will be better 
off? 
Another set of interesting questions involves defining the elements of 
the data to be shared. For example, given the cost of data processing and 
security considerations, should SKU-level data be shared or should only 
aggregate information be shared? What aggregation/disaggregation pro-
cedures are best? 
Finally, given that there are costs and benefits associated with excep-
tion-processing, regardless of how they are processed, how should excep-
tions be defined? More fundamentally, what does it mean to process an 
exception; that is, given a significant difference between and the buyer's 
and seller's forecast (planned orders), how should the difference be re-
solved? 
10. Research topics related to supply-chain 
collaboration 
Another set of interesting research questions involves the examina-
tion of supply-chain collaboration in general, whether or not the tools 
used are those of CPFR. For example, given a supply chain with some 
given level of collaboration in information-sharing, decision-making, im-
plementation, and buffering - including no collaboration whatsoever -
then, assuming that collaboration will be increased, which links should 
be involved, and in which components of the IDIB will collaboration 
yield the largest payoffs to the involved partners and to the entire sup-
ply chain? Further, how will be benefits of collaboration be measured 
and shared between partners and along the chain? 
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An equally interesting set of questions involve collaboration itself. For 
example, consider a supply chain with some given level of collaboration 
in information-sharing, decision-making, implementation, and buffering 
- including no collaboration whatsoever. Then, given the costs and 
challenges of collaboration, is collaboration the most cost-effective way to 
improve supply-chain performance? In particular, improving the quality 
of one or more of the components of one of the partner's IDIB pOrtfolios 
may yield larger improvements at lower cost. If so, then, again, how will 
benefits be measured and shared? 
11. Research on the IDIB portfolio 
In generalizing the OR paradigm, the IDIB Portfolio paradigm pro-
vides rich and challenging opportunities for operations researchers. 
I believe that the OR paradigm has focused almost entirely on model· 
ing only a single component of supply-chain IDIB portfolios, typically on 
the decision-making component. To the extent that the associated infor-
mation and implementation systems are represented, these models treat 
them as fixed, as costs, or as constraints, but not as decision-variables. 
For example, such models typically take the quality of the information 
system as given (e.g., demand is known or given by some particular 
probability distribution with fixed parameters) and implementation sys-
tems are represented as parameterized lead times or by their cost drivers 
(e.g., the parameterized cost of performing a set up or the unit cost of 
holding inventory). The form of buffering {i.e., inventory, lead time, or 
capacity) is usually also fixed. In general, the objective function is to 
select the decision (or decision-rule) that minimizes the associated im-
plementation costs plus the too-much and not-enough costs associated 
with the buffer system. Other models, in particular, those that treat 
either the information system or the implementation system as a deci-
sion variable, typically ignore the other three components of the IDIB 
as decision variables. 
That's the "bad news". 
The "good news" is that the OR paradigm's focus has facilitated the 
development of fairly sophisticated decision rules and provided limited 
insight into information and implementation systems. It is also "good 
news" that many of the techniques employed in the OR paradigm, for 
example, well-proven estimation and optimization techniques, can be 
applied improving, if not optimizing, the IDIB Portfolio model of a 
management system. For example, cost-estimating techniques that are 
already being applied to estimating the cost of a given implementation 
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system can be applied to determining the cost of alternative information, 
implementation, and buffer systems. 
Notwithstanding the availability of OR tools, the challenges of IDIB 
Portfolio optimization, even if done heuristically, are daunting. Recall, 
the "optimal IDIB Portfolio" is the portfolio of information, decision-
making, implementation, and buffering whose combined cost plus the 
cost of failing to provide enough of whatever was demanded or required 
(e.g., backordering or expediting cost) is the minimum possible cost. 
Hence, IDIB Portfolio optimization involves four decision-variables not 
simply one. Further, in order to be useful in selecting an IDIB portfolio, 
IDIB models must be able to capture complex cost-quality interactions 
among these components, not just the cost-quality characteristic of each 
component. 
Practice-oriented research also presents interesting research opportu-
nities. For example, consider a firm's current IDIB portfolio and assume 
management has the desire to "improven it. The question is: Where 
(i.e., which component is the "bottleneck" of the current IDL systems 
and what improvement should be made to it? Before this question can 
be answered, operations researcher must first develop techniques and 
measures to assess the capabilities of each of its components. Next, in 
order to make the most cost-effective improvement, managers will re-
quire a priori estimates of the marginal costs and benefits of the next 
increment in quality in their current components. Further, there are 
questions relating to the timing of !DIE portfolio changes. For example, 
although adopting current technology might reduce total portfolio cost, 
should management forego adopting it, and, instead, wait for new tech-
nology that might provide even larger total cost reductions? Technology 
forecasting must play a role in answering this question. 
Despite the daunting nature of the challenges to improving a firm's 
current IDIB portfolio or optimizing a proposed IDIB portfolio, oper-
ations researchers will be foregoing a tremendous opportunity if they 
continue to focus on optimizing one component of the IDIB portfolio at 
a time. Worse, they commit the Cardinal Sin of Operations Research: 
Sub-Optimization. 
12. Some related literature 
Most of the literature in supply-chain management can be viewed from 
the perspective of the IDIB portfolio. As explained above, I believe that 
most of this literature examines the choice of the decision (e.g., order 
quantity, target inventory) or decision-rule (e.g., BOQ) to minimize total 
buffer quantity. See the discussion of the newsvendor model above, for 
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example. Some of this literature also examines the impact of implemen-
tation issues on the decision-making. For example, in a highly-stylized 
way the EOQ formula represents the impact of set-up (i.e., implementa-
tion) cost on the optimal order quantity. However, there are some signs 
of interesting developments. 
A growing body of literature examines the value of information-sharing 
in managing a supply chain. Lee et al., 2000: for example, have shown 
that information-sharing can dampen the so-called "bullwhip effect" so 
often observed in supply chains. Chen et al., 2000 have shown that the 
bullwhip effect can be reduced by centralizing information. Cachon and 
Fisher, 2000 study the value of sharing demand and inventory-level infor-
mation in a supply chain. Aviv, 2001 examines the effect of collaborative 
forecasting on supply-chain performance. 
A small, but growing body of research involves collaborative replen-
ishment decision-making to take advantage of shared information. For 
example, Song and Zipkin, 1996 develop an inventory-replenishment pol-
icy to take advantage of information about supply conditions. Aviv, 
2002 examines joint forecasting and replenishment processes. Iyer and 
Ye, 2000 develop a model to assess the value of information-sharing in 
a retail environment in which retailers share promotional information 
with their suppliers. 
However, I am not aware of any research that addresses itself to "man-
aging the IDIB Portfolid'; that is, making decisions about the nature 
and quality of all its four components: the information, decision-making, 
implementation, and buffer systems. 
Nonetheless, there are two papers of particular relevance to "managing 
the IDIB Portfolio that I would like to draw attention to: 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1988 develop a model of a manufacturer and 
the market for its products, and, for this particular model, establish 
that the optimal management system will either produce to inventory 
or produce to customer order. In IDIB Portfolio terms, Milgrom and 
Roberts examine a model in which there is a cost to acquire information 
about market demand and a cost to produce. Their analysis concludes 
that a profit-maximizing firm will either: (1) acquire no additional in-
formation about customer demand and produce entirely to inventory; or 
{2) acquire complete information about customer demand and produce 
entirely to customer order. 
It should be noted that Milgrom and Robert's result is specific to the 
assumptions of the model they propose. Other assumptions would yield 
different results. For example, Milgrom and Robert's model ignores the 
production (implementation) leadtime, customer preferences, and com-
petition. Given significant production leadtimes and customer prefer-
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ence for availability over variety, a manufacturer that might otherwise 
choose make-to-order might be forced to make to stock. Alternatively, 
given customer preference for variety over availability, a manufacturer 
that might otherwise choose make-to-stock might be forced to make to 
order. Nonetheless, Milgram and Roberts are the first to suggest trade-
off's between information and inventory {i.e., one form of buffer). 
Hariharan and Zipkin, 1995 implicitly suggest tradeoffs between the 
characteristics of a company's information system and implementation 
system. In particular, within a supply-chain setting, they establish the 
equivalence between the information system's ability to "see'' one more 
(Jess) period of demand into the future and the ability of the implemen-
tation system to produce one period faster {slower). 
The use of the "ICE Portfolio" paradigm, which is closely related to 
the IDIB paradigm, in teaching operations management can be found in 
Schwarz, 1998. 
13. Summary 
In this chapter, I have introduced a new paradigm for management in 
general and for managing supply chains, in particular, called the IDIB 
Portfolio. The !DIE Portfolio, which can be viewed as a generalization of 
the OR paradigm, takes the view, that the quality of all four components 
of a management system- not just the buffer system quality (i.e., size) 
- are decision variables; and that the underlying quality-cost function 
for each of these components - that is~ the cost to move them in the 
direction of perfection - is increasing and marginally increasing. Finally, 
that there is a cost associated with the entire !DIE portfolio - again, 
not just the buffer system - for failing to provide whatever is required 
or demanded. Hence, the "optimal" !DIE is the !DIE that minimizes 
the total costs of all of its components plus the cost of failing to provide 
whatever is required or demanded. 
The !DIE Portfolio and its axioms provide insight into the evolution 
of supply-chain practice to date, and, I believe, suggest that the future of 
supply-chain management practice will involve a significant level of col-
laborative decision-making and implementation: a level of collaboration 
in decision-making and implementation that is comparable to the level of 
information-sharing in contemporary supply-chain management. I have 
described the VICS CPFR initiative as one example of this future. Fi-
nally, I have suggested several research topics involving CPFR and, more 
broadly, challenging new research into the IDIB Portfolio paradigm. 
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Appendix: List of Buyers and Suppliers participating 
in CPFR partnerships 
Source: The VICS CPFR® Matrix, January 2002. This list is maintained monthly 
by Moon Watch Media, Inc. See http: I /wwY .retailsystems. com/communi tycenters 
/cccc/cpfrmatrix.pdf. 
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